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Abstract
Theorists have argued that under certain background conditions the 
commercial, for-profit  corporation might bear responsibility to act to ad-
vance justice.  However, other agents, too, may be responsible for taking 
remedial action, especially when the state defaults. This raises the ques-
tion of the sequence in which the agents should act. I develop a frame-
work that offers guidance in determining when the corporation ought 
to intervene to advance justice. The existing literature typically identi-
fies responsibility-bearers solely by their capacity to remedy an unjust 
situation, which I believe to be too simplistic. I introduce two additional 
grounds for identifying responsibility-bearers—a role-based account and 
participation-based account—and show that this pluralist approach de-
livers a better account of who bears responsibility to act and when to 
discharge this responsibility. 
Introduction
Several theorists, including O’Neill and Caney, have recently ar-
gued that the commercial, for-profit corporation may bear respon-
sibility to intervene in public affairs of societies in which they op-
erate to promote social justice.1 The argument holds that this is 
particularly the case where citizens suffer the burden of injustices 
while their government is either unwilling or unable to secure jus-
tice. Responsibility attribution is typically made on the grounds 
that corporations possess the capacity to remedy injustices. 
 This article considers the role of the corporation in ad-
vancing justice, and extends it in two ways. Firstly, I argue that a 
capacity-based account of responsibility used by others to assign 
responsibility to the corporation is weak and needs to be aug-
mented with the participation-based account. This approach takes 
account of the role the corporation might have played in bringing 
about or propagating the injustice (akin to the “polluter pays prin-
ciple” used in climate justice). Secondly, I argue that, in the pres-
ence of other potential agents who could remedy injustices, such 
i The word “when” is used to refer to sequential action, that is, in what order 
agents should act, not the temporal sense as in, at what time an agent should 
act.
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84 as multilateral organizations, foreign states, NGOs, and so on, it is 
not enough to simply identify the corporation as a responsibility-
bearer; we also need to offer guidance on when the corporation 
should step in. 
 Generally, reference to “responsibility” could broadly mean 
“responsibility for having done something” (this might be termed 
“retrospective”) or “responsibility to do something” (this might be 
termed “prospective”). In this article, I refer to the latter meaning; 
making an argument for the corporation bearing responsibility to 
act to advance justice.ii  
 The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I briefly 
outline the existing argument for the corporation as responsibili-
ty-bearer, which I will later augment with the participation princi-
ple. This is followed in the second section with the development of 
a justice intervention framework, which provides the theoretical 
underpinning for identifying responsibility-bearers and ranking 
them. Finally, in the third section, I apply this framework to the 
corporation in three different situations of injustice to determine 
when it would be required to intervene.
The Corporation as Responsibility-Bearer
The thought of corporations bearing responsibility to advance jus-
tice might strike some as odd at first. It is unlikely, though not im-
plausible, that entrepreneurs set out to establish new businesses 
with the goal of making the world more just. Similarly, established 
multinational commercial corporations are unlikely to have the 
advancement of social justice as their main objective.iii  If the gen-
eration of profit for shareholders is the primary purpose of every 
commercial corporation, why should we look to the corporation to 
advance justice? 
 This line of thinking mistakenly suggests that an agent 
has only one set of duties that it can be called upon to discharge. 
This is too simplistic a view of the corporation. O’Neill, for exam-
ple argues that corporations are “economically and socially com-
plex institutions … their constitutive aims are typically diverse 
and multiple” and are “evidently capable of throwing their con-
siderable weight in the direction either of greater justice, or of the 
status quo, or of greater injustice.”2 Rather than a narrow focus on 
shareholder interests, Hsieh sees corporate purpose as “allowing 
members of society to meet their wants and needs by coordinat-
ii I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification.
iii  While “corporation” could refer to a university or public broadcaster such as 
the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) who might have social justice objec-
tives, my focus is on the corporation whose main purpose is the generation of 
profit, the type of corporation that would be listed on a stock exchange. 
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Without necessarily neglecting its other responsibilities, the cor-
poration does possess the capacity to advance justice to 
some degree. 
 The basic argument put forward by O’Neill and others is 
that, in a weak state (that is, a state that does not possess the pow-
er to secure justice) the corporation, which is assumed to possess 
the capacity and power to contribute to the advancement of jus-
tice, bears a responsibility to do so. O’Neill distinguishes between 
two types of agents, namely primary agents of justice, who have 
capacities to determine how principles of justice are to be institu-
tionalized within a certain domain, and secondary agents of jus-
tice, who contribute to justice by complying with the demands of 
primary agents.4 Caney suggests that rather than types of agents 
who possess fixed characteristics, agents have roles which they 
play in given circumstances.5 In its secondary agent role, the ex-
tent of the corporation’s justice advancing activities would be to 
comply with just legal requirements. However, this changes (the 
argument goes) when the state is unwilling or unable to secure jus-
tice. In such a case the corporation might bear responsibility to act 
as more-than-secondary agent, indeed assuming primary respon-
sibility to secure justice. Note that such a responsibility, and the 
type of responsibility considered in this article, is more demanding 
than is typically considered by theories of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR). These theories typically consider socially-orientated 
acts by corporations to be voluntary, and justifiable only if such 
acts do not impact the generation of profit.6 As I will argue, there 
are circumstances and grounds for assigning this more demand-
ing, non-voluntary responsibility, to the corporation.   
 To be sure, the corporation is not the only agent that could 
step in when the state neglects its duties. What role should other 
states play? What about multilateral organizations such as the 
United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and what 
about Non-governmental Organizations? If indeed these other 
agents bear responsibility to advance justice in a domain, in addi-
tion to the corporation, the important question for this paper is: 
in what order should the agents act? To begin to answer this ques-
tion, I now turn to the development of what I have simply termed 
a justice intervention framework.
A Framework for Guiding the Sequence of Justice 
Interventions
The importance of identifying specific responsibility-bearers is 
straightforward: the pursuit of justice will be ineffective unless ob-
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which are able to discharge those obligations.”7 Miller warns that if 
responsibility is too widely dispersed, then it is of no motivational 
value because there is no compulsion for any specific actor to act.8 
Everyone will wait to see if someone else acts. Most observers of 
an injustice would assert that some actor is morally required to 
provide the resources and bring about changes in policies and so-
cial arrangements necessary to address the injustices, but few feel 
particularly responsible to work towards their enactment.9 Conse-
quently, unless we start to define and allocate responsibilities, the 
practical impact of theorizing principles of justice will necessar-
ily be small.10 Where multiple agents have been picked out to act, 
merely identifying them is not enough; without knowing the order 
or sequence in which they should act and the expected scope of 
their intervention, we might end up with the same problem as be-
fore, in that no-one might act even when we have identified them 
as responsibility-bearers. We might not want all agents acting si-
multaneously, not only due to the chaos this might cause, but also 
because advancing justice might in fact require sequential action. 
So, in addition to identifying the set of responsibility-bearers, 
theorizing the responsibility to act must also indicate the order in 
which agents should act and how the burden of advancing justice 
should be distributed among them. 
 Caney offers the useful notion of levels of responsibility and 
suggests that under varying conditions some agents bear greater 
responsibility to act than others, but offers little guidance on the 
grounds by which agents could be ranked.11 The justice intervention 
framework developed here seeks to offer this guidance.  
 We want a framework that offers guidance on when an 
agent should act, that is, the sequence or order of its interven-
tion, when other responsibility-bearers exist. So we might iden-
tify responsibility-bearers x, y and z, but want to determine who 
should act first, second and, third. Consider a situation where you 
and a handful of others are gathered outside a burning building 
with people trapped inside. Who should enter the building to save 
those inside? If one of you is a trained fireman then it would be 
reasonable to look to him to be the first to enter the building, af-
ter all, he has the training and special equipment to perform the 
required rescue tasks. But who would be next in line? Imagine the 
fireman goes into the building and calls for assistance, or imagine 
if there was no fireman among those gathered. Whose responsibil-
ity would it be to incur the cost of entering the building? We would 
most likely settle on a subset of those gathered who we deem to 
possess the requirements for someone to perform the rescue op-
eration. So we might rule out the young child, the elderly man, the 
87woman in a wheelchair, and so on. Essentially what we would do 
is rank the available would-be rescuers by their potential ability to 
perform the required tasks. We might decide that the next person 
in line to enter the building should be the ablest person who has 
received some emergency training or the strongest person since 
both would be able to carry the victims out.
 Now imagine we discover that among those gathered is a 
person who was involved in setting the building on fire. We might 
be inclined to push him to the front of the line to enter the build-
ing to rescue the victims, although some might worry that since he 
started the fire he may not want to rescue those inside. It would 
be reasonable to expect the person who caused the bad situation 
to bear some responsibility to fix it. To add one last complication, 
what if the woman in the wheelchair is the one who started the 
fire? Now we face a dilemma—we believe that the person who 
bears responsibility, owing to their causal involvement, should be 
the one to bring remedy, but we also want the rescue to be success-
ful. It is unlikely that someone confined to a wheelchair would be 
able to enter a burning building and rescue those trapped inside. 
Do we therefore rule out the woman in the wheelchair and con-
tinue down the line of those gathered to identify the next rescuer 
or can we still hold the woman primarily responsible?
 This example offers us guidance on at least three steps we 
would need to follow to determine when a target agent should act 
to remedy injustice, in the presence of other responsible agents:
Step 1: Establish that the target agent bears responsibility 
to act to remedy the injustice.
 Step 2: Identify the set of other responsibility-bearers. 
Step 3: Rank the set of responsibility-bearers to reveal 
when the target agent should act.
 Step 1 requires that we develop the grounds for identify-
ing agents who bear remedial responsibility, and then applying it 
to our target agent, in our case, the corporation. Step 2 requires 
a scan of possible agents using the grounds established in Step 1 
to determine who else might bear responsibility to act, especially 
those who might have responsibility to act before the target agent. 
This list of agents will necessarily depend on the background con-
ditions and the injustice in question. Finally, Step 3 requires that 
we establish a ranking logic and apply this ranking to the agents 
identified in Step 2 and our target agent. Suppose that Step 3 de-
termines that responsibility-bearers x, y, and z are responsible to 
act in that order. We think that after x, y is next most responsible, 
such that if x defaults, then y should act. Then, if x and y defaults, 
88 z should act. It is conceivable that both y and z bear responsibil-
ity to act if x should default—if this is the case, then it should be 
stated clearly in the sequencing of responsibility-bearers.iv In the 
next section, I will develop the grounds for Step 1 and the ranking 
logic for Step 3, and then apply the framework to the corporation 
to answer the question of when it should intervene. 
Grounds for Identifying Responsibility-Bearers
The burning building example is a good illustration of the chal-
lenge we face in identifying those actors who ought to intervene 
to remedy an injustice or act to restore justice. In situations where 
multiple agents are present, it is not obvious who should act first, 
or who is next in line after the bearer of primary responsibility has 
acted or neglected to act. The example suggests that there are at 
least three accounts for identifying responsibility-bearers, namely 
a role-based, a capacity-based, and a participation-based account.  
Role-based identification
Identifying the fireman as the agent to act in our burning building 
example demonstrates the role-based account of identifying the 
responsible agent. We do not identify the fireman because of any 
natural attributes or capacities but because he has been trained 
and equipped to perform a role in society. We would argue that it 
is his duty to act and that he is permitted to act since society has 
legitimized his actions (within a remit) by assigning him this role. 
We assign to him certain role permissions by virtue of his job: we 
permit him to break certain road rules, for example, allowing him 
to speed through traffic or drive up one-way streets in the course 
of performing his assigned duties. He also bears certain role obli-
gations by virtue of his job; society expects him to enter burning 
buildings, an expectation we do not have of ordinary citizens. It is 
not unreasonable for non-firemen to step out of the way so that 
the fireman can act since it will almost always be better to let those 
who have been assigned responsibility to get on with the job.12
 In this way, it is not unreasonable—when looking to an 
agent to secure justice—that we look to the state. State legitimacy 
is derived from its commitment to secure the human rights of its 
citizens. States, too, possess capabilities that may be deemed es-
sential to secure justice—Nagel, for example, argues that the state 
is the only agent endowed with the required coordination ability 
and coercion of the scale and type that is required for justice.13 
Society grants states permission to perform certain duties and 
iv  I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification.
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injustices that arise, and certainly not to be perpetrators of injus-
tice. Even O’Neill, who challenges the exclusive focus of states as 
agents of justice, acknowledges that it is hard to institutionalize 
principles of justice: although states quite often do not do very 
well as primary agents of justice, they are the best primary agents 
available, and thus are indispensable for justice.14 
 Could a role-based account identify other agents? We cer-
tainly would not identify the corporation as an agent of justice on 
the role-based account. Regardless of our account of the corpora-
tion’s constitutive purpose, it is unlikely to include the pursuit of 
justice as its main purpose. We currently do not have any institu-
tion other than the state whose role it is to secure justice; that is, 
an institution whose constitutive purpose includes the securing of 
justice. While we may assign such responsibility to agents on other 
grounds (as we will discuss shortly) none have been created for 
this purpose. This is particularly the case when we are considering 
global justice: we can justifiably doubt that humanitarian inter-
vention could be codified into international law in such a way that 
an international body could pronounce on which agent (or agents) 
should intervene.15 The weakness of a role-based account of re-
sponsibility is that it offers no guidance in the situation where the 
role-bearer fails to perform its duty, whether through negligence 
or being unwilling or unable to do so, a situation which is our 
focus.  
Capacity-based Identification
The capacity principle states that responsibilities to remedy or pro-
tect against harm or injustice ought to be assigned according to 
the capacity that agents possess to discharge these remedies or 
protections.16 In a capacity-based account of identifying responsi-
bility-bearers, lies the fact that an agent possesses the capacity to 
remedy deprivations, which entails the responsibility to do so.17 
As we did in our burning building example, a capacity-based form 
of identifying responsibility-bearers picked out the ablest person 
who has received some emergency training or perhaps the physi-
cally strongest person since rescuing the fire victims would entail 
heavy lifting. While Pattison focuses on effectiveness of interven-
tions in determining who should intervene in humanitarian cri-
ses, he acknowledges that capacity to intervene successfully is the 
most obvious requirement of an agent to intervene.18
 In theorizing responsibility to act to restore or remedy in-
justice, effectiveness matters significantly. We want the injustice 
to be effectively remedied, and so it is reasonable that we look to 
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required tasks.  As O’Neill points out, capacities are “constitutive 
of agency, and without agency any account of obligations will be 
no more than gesture.”19 
 However, the capacity-based account bears several flaws. 
In claiming that the possession of the capacity to act entails the re-
sponsibility to do so, the capacity principle is “insensitive to costs 
to potential responsibility-bearers.”20 A reasonable constraint to 
action is that if acting imposes an unfair cost on the agent or cre-
ates a new harm then the agent would not be deemed blameworthy 
for not taking the action.21 The principle would pick out for action 
an agent who may live a frugal lifestyle and save his resources, but 
would overlook an agent who is reckless with his resources, even if 
the latter was involved in the injustice. The principle assumes that 
the capacity possessed by the first agent is unencumbered and so 
available to be deployed for the remedial purposes, but the agent 
could have had plans for deployment of the resources. Perhaps 
a modification of capacity principle would be to assess available 
or unencumbered capacity which would be less insensitive to the 
costs to potential responsibility-bearers. 
 A further weakness is that the principle is conceptually 
vague: what do we mean when we say that an agent possesses 
the “capacity to remedy an injustice”? This seems to require the 
co-ordination of expected actions and resources required for the 
remedy with some assessment of the agent’s possession of these 
resources and the ability to deploy them effectively. This cannot be 
known ex ante, and as Miller points out, leads us into the terrain of 
informed conjecture.22 Furthermore, it is unlikely in most cases of 
injustice that a single agent can bring about remedy. More likely, it 
will require actions from multiple agents over an extended period, 
sometimes several years or decades. Therefore, speaking of assign-
ing responsibility to an agent to “remedy” injustice or “restore” 
justice is misleading. A more accurate statement would be that we 
are assigning responsibility to contribute to a remedy.  What fol-
lows is that, in most cases, every conceivable agent would possess 
some quantum of capacity to contribute to justice, thus rendering 
the concept completely hollow because responsibility would be too 
dispersed. While I agree that we should pursue paths that will of-
fer most likely possibility of effective remedy, I do not believe that 
the capacity-based identification approach offers us the best way 
to achieve this. Its flaws render it too weak to compel an agent to 
act. As I show below, I am not arguing that we discard the capacity-
based account, but that it will be useful in conjunction with the 
participation-based account, which offers stronger attribution of 
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account.
Participation-based Identification 
A participation-based identification of responsibility-bearers ap-
peals to our negative duty to do no harm. Agents bear a duty not 
to cause harm—this duty unfolds into a responsibility to avoid 
harm, remedy harm, and prevent harm. Remedial responsibility 
derives from violation of these duties. We assign responsibility 
to put out the fire or save the trapped victims to the person who 
set the building alight because of our intuition that an agent who 
causes harm has a responsibility to act to remedy this harm. The 
participation principle states that an agent can be identified as a 
responsibility-bearer on the grounds that it participated or par-
ticipates in direct acts or institutional arrangements that cause 
or perpetuate injustices. By this principle, we pick out the blame-
worthy agent. By holding this agent responsible we not only cre-
ate a mechanism for remedying the injustice, but we also help 
to put right the moral imbalance between the actor and victims. 
The principle reflects the ideas of connection described by Miller, 
Young, and others which connect the actor and the injustice or 
victim of injustice. It also captures Barry’s contribution principle, in 
which agents are held responsible for remedying a harm when, and 
to the extent that, they have contributed to creating harm. Ad-
ditionally, it includes what Kroslak refers to as involvement prior 
to and during the acts of injustice as a criterion for identifying 
responsibility bearers.23
 The participation principle picks out actors who are, or 
have been, actively engaged in acts that relate to the victim or so-
cial process in perpetrating, benefitting, or perpetuating an injus-
tice. It is not the passive relation that matters or the mere fact of 
being a member of a community, as Miller suggests, but the act 
of actively participating in the unjust situation.24 In what follows, 
I identify four ways in which an agent can participate in an injus-
tice, and thus, acquire remedial responsibility on a participation-
based account.
 Firstly, a perpetrator of an unjust act is an actor who causes 
harm to a person or persons with intention to cause this harm.25 
If person x is identified as having intentionally set the building 
alight, then x can straightforwardly be identified as the perpetra-
tor. A second way that an agent could participate in an injustice is 
as a collaborator. This is an actor who does not perform the unjust 
act but intentionally supports the perpetrator in his commission of 
the act. While x might have poured the petrol around the building 
92 and set the fuel alight with a match, his friend y could have collabo-
rated by driving x to the building, or could have helped him acquire 
the petrol and matches all with the intent of setting the building 
alight. Though not as blameworthy as x, y certainly participates in 
the unjust act. A third role, that of bystander is an actor who neither 
commits nor supports the commission of the unjust act; however, 
even though he has some power to stop the act, allows it to happen, 
especially if he knows that harm will befall the victim. If z observes 
the scene with x arriving to set the building alight but does noth-
ing to stop him, even though he is able to, z would be regarded as a 
bystander in the wrongful act and would not be blameless. It might 
seem harsh to categorize a bystander as participating in the injus-
tice, but by not intervening to stop the injustice, the bystander has 
contributed to the injustice coming to pass. The bystander would 
not carry as much moral culpability for the injustice as the other two 
actors.
 A fourth potential role that an actor could play in an injus-
tice is that of beneficiary. Suppose that an actor has played no causal 
role in the process that led to a victim’s deprivation but has nonethe-
less benefited from that process, for example, by gaining resources 
that belonged to the victim. If, after x delivers a disabling punch in 
the face to y, x takes money from y’s pocket and shares it with his 
friends, including z, who played no role at all in the punching or 
robbing. We would consider z a beneficiary of the unjust acts. By 
benefitting from the injustice, z becomes connected to the victim, y. 
We would judge that the beneficiary has sufficient reason to return 
the stolen money to the victim since he has been unjustly enriched 
even if he himself has not behaved unjustly. This idea is illustrated 
by Thomson in her argument for preferential hiring of black males 
and women over white males in the United States, given the coun-
try’s discriminatory past. Referring to white males, she writes: 
No doubt few, if any, have themselves, individually, done any 
wrongs to blacks and women. But they have profited from the 
wrongs the [white] community did. Many may actually have 
been direct beneficiaries of policies which excluded or down-
graded blacks and women—perhaps in school admissions, 
perhaps in access to financial aid, perhaps elsewhere.26 
Thomson makes the point that the absence of direct acts of injus-
tice does not preclude culpability for such injustices if an actor has 
benefitted from the injustice. The strength of one’s ethical reason to 
alleviate some hardship or unfair social rules depends on the extent 
to which one has benefitted from its injustice, even if, by being en-
riched, you have not behaved unjustly.27
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corporations commit direct harmful acts such as endangering 
the lives or livelihoods of employees, customers or communities 
through negligent, risky or malicious practices, such as poor fac-
tory maintenance, taking on excessive debt, or discharging poi-
sonous effluent from a factory into a water source. But sometimes 
the nature of a corporation’s operations or the nature of the in-
justice is such that it is not possible to identify a single harmful 
act or a wrongdoer such as in cases of structural injustices. These 
injustices are propagated through social process and structures 
through time by agents’ every day actions, which are products of 
previous actions that are coordinated and uncoordinated but mu-
tually influencing actions.28 According to Young, “people act on 
the basis of their knowledge of pre-existing structures and in so 
acting reproduce those structures.”29 These social norms are often 
informal, undocumented behaviours, and processes that are built 
into the normal operations of society and are embedded in social 
institutions, and thus do not arise from intentional harmful acts. 
They arise when a social order is characterized by weak or unfair 
rules, such that deprivations can exist without being easily trace-
able to the actions of particular individuals or groups.30 Similarly, 
Pogge argues, that in the global context, by shaping and enforcing 
the social conditions that avoidably cause devastating poverty, the 
affluent- through trade and corporate activity- are actively harm-
ing the poor, and gaining their wealth at the expense of the poor.31 
According to this idea, it is the social processes that propagate in-
justices, and since corporations participate by their actions in the 
ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute these processes, 
they ought to share in the responsibility of the outcomes of these 
processes. Corporate participation is to be found in shared social 
arrangements through trade, employment, the banking system 
and the capital markets, all avenues through which injustices are 
also metered out on the vulnerable. 
 A typical objection to the participation-based identifica-
tion account is that expressed by Pattison, who points to the diffi-
culty in disentangling the role played by a potential responsibility-
bearer from that of other agents. Moreover, the agent responsible 
for the injustice would be ineffective because the victims will resist 
its involvement in remedy owing perhaps to their distrust of the 
agent.32 I agree with Miller’s response to Pattison, that the claimed 
indeterminacy of an agent who participated in an injustice is no 
more indeterminate than the issue of future effectiveness, which 
the capacity account advocates. Miller writes: 
94 The past may need interpretation, but at least the record is 
open to inspection, whereas when we are trying to judge who 
will be most effective in bringing the human rights violations 
to an end, we are at best in the realm of informed conjecture.33
  
The most severe difficulty that the participation-based account fac-
es is the claim that it is self-defeating in cases where an agent may 
have participated in the injustice but does not possess the capacity to 
remedy the injustice. The claim is that we are no better off since we 
would have a responsibility-bearer who cannot act- although there 
are agents who possess the capacity to act to remedy the injustice, 
but who have not been picked out by the participation principle. 
However, as indicated above, the idea of an agent lacking capacity 
seems mistaken.
 Is participation necessary and sufficient? There is greater 
moral force to assigning remedial responsibility to an agent who 
participated in someone’s suffering but lacks the capacity to remedy 
the injustice itself, than merely an agent who possesses the capac-
ity to remedy. The idea that an agent needs the capacity to act de-
pends importantly on what the act requires but also what we mean 
by capacity. The capacity principle rejects the idea that an agent who 
lacks capacity can be effective in remedying the injustice. This might 
sound like common sense but it does depend on our definition of 
capacity. For example, we could identify the agent who bears the ca-
pacity to extinguish a burning building as the agent who possesses 
the skill and equipment to fight a fire. But what about an agent who 
possesses neither but has the ability to contact the fire station in an 
emergency which others lack, or possesses the ability to convince a 
fire chief that this fire is more important than the training his team 
is about to embark on. The woman in the wheelchair may not be able 
to enter the burning building but this does not mean she is off the 
hook. There are actions that she can take that would contribute to 
the rescue of those trapped inside. These actions may include calling 
an emergency telephone number, trying to coordinate the rescuers 
or offering material help, such as water and energy bars to those en-
tering the building to sustain them. 
 Surely an ability to facilitate the delivery of the remedy 
contributes to the remedy even if this agent is not part of the ac-
tual delivery. This broadens our definition of capacity. In essence, an 
agent bears capacity if it can contribute, in some way, to the remedy, 
whether acting directly upon the injustice, marshalling others to act, 
or making another type of remedial contribution. If we accept that 
every agent bears this minimum capacity, then our grounds for at-
tributing responsibility can be participation alone. On the grounds 
of its participation, we hold an agent responsible for ensuring that 
95the injustice is remedied. This can be achieved through its own ac-
tion or facilitating the action of others. 
 A Logic for Ranking Responsibility-Bearers   
Theorists often deal with the concept of responsibility-bearer in 
a binary fashion, that is, an agent either bears responsibility or 
it does not. The reality is that agents bear degrees of responsi-
bility. In a globally-connected world, virtually every agent is con-
nected to every other however minute or diffuse that connection 
might be. A person buying a T-shirt in a London department store 
is distantly connected to the person manufacturing the T-shirt 
in a sweatshop in Asia. But we would certainly hold the owner of 
the sweatshop more responsible for the injustice in the sweatshop 
than the person in London. 
 Caney distinguishes between different types of duties that 
agents of justice can bear.34 A first-order duty-bearer is a duty-
bearer who should in the first instance perform the duty. As we 
have discussed, he, too, acknowledges that first-order duty-bearers 
sometimes do not do what they are supposed to do. Where there 
has been a failure to act by a first-order duty-bearer, there needs 
to be a back-up to step into their place to ensure that the injustice 
is remedied. This back-up needs to fulfil the role that the original 
duty-bearer should have performed. This process can then be iter-
ated if the second-order duty-bearer fails to do their job, 
and so on.    
 The discussion on the grounds of assigning responsibility 
offers us the following guidance in terms of factors that we should 
apply to agents to determine the order in which they should inter-
vene to remedy injustice:
Factor 1: Agent(s) who have been assigned the role by 
society. 
Factor 2: Agent(s) who have participated in the injustice. 
Factor 2a: This set of agents is then ranked by 
levels of participation.
Factor 3: Agent(s) who have not participated in 
the injustice. 
Factor 3a: This set of agents in ranked by effective 
capacity.
Factors 1, 2, and 3 give us a macro-ranking of the sets of agents, 
with Factors 2a and 3a ranking the agents within these sets.
 The factors are applied as follows: faced with an injustice 
that requires remedy, we first apply Factor 1 to the set of all poten-
96 tial agents and prioritize for intervention those agents to whom 
society has assigned the role to address the injustice at hand. If 
this agent fails, neglects its duty, or its efforts are insufficient to 
remedy the injustice, we will look to the remainder of agents to 
pick out those who ought to intervene. We start by applying Fac-
tor 2 to the remaining agents, picking out those who have par-
ticipated in the injustice whether directly or through institutional 
arrangements, or whether as perpetrator, collaborator, bystander, 
or beneficiary. If these agents are ineffective in remedying the in-
justice we then look to the remaining agents who we rank by their 
capacity to contribute to the remedial action.  This sequential pro-
cess offers us a guideline for the order in which agents should act. 
It is not without difficulties as we would expect. The challenge of 
ranking effective capacity among agents remains, and so does the 
challenge of ranking levels of participation, especially when agents 
have participated in different ways. These challenges will need fur-
ther work to address.
Restatement of the Justice Intervention Framework
The three steps and three factors combine into our framework. 
The factors are employed to guide decisions for each of the steps.
Steps:
Step 1: Establish that the target agent bears responsibility 
to act to remedy the injustice.
Step 2: Identify the set of other responsibility-bearers. 
Step 3: Rank the set of responsibility-bearers to reveal 
when the target agent should act.
Factors:
Factor 1: Agent(s) who have been assigned the role by society. 
Factor 2: Agent(s) who have participated in the injustice. 
 Factor 2a: This set of agents is then ranked by levels 
of participation.
Factor 3: Agent(s) who have not participated in the injustice. 
Factor 3a: This set of agents in ranked by effective capacity.
We are now in a position to assess when the corporation should 
intervene to remedy injustice.
Applying the Justice Intervention Framework: The Case of 
the Corporation
While our principles of justice and grounds for identifying respon-
97sibility do not change as we consider different unjust situations, 
the actor who is picked out as responsibility-bearer will change 
depending on the situation of the injustice. We identified the fire-
man because there was a fire; in a different situation, say a medi-
cal emergency, we would look to paramedics or doctors as bearing 
responsibility on the grounds of their role. In considering when 
the corporation bears responsibility to act, I propose that we con-
sider three different situations with distinctly different injustices 
and different remedies. I will consider situations of a humanitar-
ian crisis, such as armed genocide, requiring military intervention, 
a humanitarian crisis that does not require military intervention, 
such as mass starvation due to poor governance, and worker ex-
ploitation.  I hope to show that corporations hold different posi-
tions of priority to act in different unjust situations.  
 In considering the corporation as a bearer of justice-re-
sponsibility, I will not seek to present a full defence against objec-
tions to the corporation bearing any such responsibility. The most 
common of these is that the corporation only bears responsibility 
to its shareholders, and that any other application of its resources 
would be neglect of this responsibility. Relying on the arguments 
that others have made, I am here taking as given that the corpora-
tion is an agent fit to be assigned moral responsibility, especially 
in the face of unjust situations and when it has participated in the 
creation of the injustice.
 I will now follow the three steps of the justice intervention 
framework with the corporation as our target agent, applying the 
three factors of the framework to each step. For each of the unjust 
situations we will imagine a country in which the injustice occurs, 
and then consider who the responsibility-bearers may be. Note 
that we are not considering a specific corporation in this analysis, 
but the typical corporation as we experience it in the real world 
today.
 
Step 1: Establish that the target agent bears responsibility to act to 
remedy the injustice.
In none of our three unjust situations would we assign responsibil-
ity to the corporation on the grounds that it is its role to restore 
justice (Factor 1). The corporation’s purpose is not to discharge 
military duties, remedies of mass starvation, or to fight against 
worker exploitation. 
 Can a corporation be judged to have participated in these 
injustices? 
 Genocide: A humanitarian crisis requiring military inter-
vention could arise, say, in a case of genocide where mass killings 
98 are committed by one section of a population against another. 
In such a case, the state could either support the killings or lack 
the power to prevent it. Given the levels of violence and death, it 
may be justifiable that external military intervention is required 
to begin the process of restoring justice. It is not inconceivable 
that some rogue corporation could support the genocide, but this 
would be unlikely in the normal course of business operations. 
While some businesses might benefit from a surge in demand for 
certain products, perhaps medical supplies, we would not consider 
this unjustified benefit, and therefore would not assign responsi-
bility to the corporation by the participation principle.  
 Mass starvation: We would assign low responsibility to the 
corporation, unless it was involved in the structural processes that 
caused food not to get to people, or prevented a group from being 
able to access food through hoarding or overpricing products. But 
in most cases starvation occurs through a combination of envi-
ronmental, economic and governance issues, the latter being ar-
guably the most significant. Corporations may possess financial 
resources to procure food and transport it to the area of need. 
This would be considered relief aid, the remedy required to change 
the structural injustice of mass starvation requires institutional 
change which the corporation can support but needs to be enacted 
by a body with such authority.
 Worker exploitation: Corporations can be involved in ex-
ploiting employees particularly when they are vulnerable owing 
to past discrimination or current forms of oppression. Such situ-
ations leave people vulnerable to exploitation, a situation where 
one party uses its superior bargaining position to win favourable 
terms for it from another party in an agreement between them. 
The agreement is morally problematic when the powerful party 
breaches certain fairness expectations to gain unfair terms for it-
self, at the expense of the weaker party, who has little reason to 
hope for a better deal.35 Corporations operating in societies with 
histories of discrimination are most likely to be in situations, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, to exploit workers. Where exploitation oc-
curs anywhere in a corporation’s supply chain, the participation 
principle picks them out to bear some responsibility for remedy.
Step 2: Identify the set of other responsibility-bearers.
Given the scale of the injustices that I want to consider, I will set 
aside identifying individuals as agents and focus on institution-
al agents. Institutions fall into three broad categories according 
to the three sectors in society, namely: public, private, and third 
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ferent levels of government whether national, provincial, or lo-
cal, state agencies such as environment protection agencies, and 
state-owned enterprises. Private sector institutions are mainly 
commercial, for-profit corporations, while third sector includes 
organizations with a social mission, namely non-profit organiza-
tions, charities, foundations, and the like. Institutions in all three 
categories could also be domestic (operating only in the country 
where the injustice occurs), multinational (operating in multiple 
countries including the country where the injustice occurs), and 
foreign (operating only in one country but not where the injus-
tice occurs). Even with these broadly-defined categories we gain a 
sense of the breadth of possible agents. 
 Genocide: The role-based account would assign first-order 
responsibility to multilateral organizations such as the UN, par-
ticularly the Security Council, and perhaps other regional institu-
tions such as the African Union if the genocide was occurring in 
Africa.  It is conceivable that the participation principle picks out 
foreign nations as responsibility-bearers. This would be the case 
where it could be argued that a foreign nation stirred up racial 
or sectarian hatred that led to the genocide or supplied military 
equipment to the perpetrators knowing their plans.
 Mass starvation: Other than the domestic state there are 
no public or private sector bodies constituted to provide for a na-
tion’s basic nutritional needs or to deal with situations of large-
scale shortages which could result in mass starvation. A global 
Inter-Governmental Organization such as the World Food Pro-
gramme does bear role responsibility for dealing with such crises 
and is equipped to deal with them. If the state has failed to secure 
the basics of food for its citizens, responsibility to protect obliga-
tions might pick out foreign states to intervene, as it would in the 
case of genocide. The participation principle would identify any 
agencies that have intentionally deprived groups of citizens of 
food or neglected to provide for them. These would most likely be 
domestic agencies.
 Worker exploitation: International political theory tends 
to focus mainly on the question of intervention in relation to 
humanitarian crises overlooking the injustices that are not con-
sidered life-or-death crises but that heap misery upon significant 
portions of the world’s population. The exploitation of people is 
one such example which comes in many forms, whether inhumane 
working conditions, slavery, or simply taking advantage of their 
vulnerability. The participation principle would most clearly pick 
out corporations as responsibility-bearers for worker exploitation 
as well as public agencies and industry bodies that either do not 
100 prevent such exploitation when they are able to do so, or actively 
lobby for such behaviour.  
Step 3: Rank the set of responsibility-bearers to reveal when the target 
agent should act.
A thorough ranking of agents for each of these injustices would 
be an empirical exercise. What I hope to do here is show that the 
Justice Intervention Framework provides the normative basis for 
setting out principles for such a ranking. It allows us to offer an 
answer to our core question: When should the corporation inter-
vene?
 Genocide: The corporation would not be a first-order re-
sponsibility-bearer in this situation and even with failures of first-
order responsibility-bearers to act, it is implausible that we would 
see a private organization, such as a commercial corporation, bear 
responsibility to perform a military intervention either at home 
or elsewhere. While this might be a fairly obvious conclusion, it 
is important for clarity that when we talk of corporations bearing 
responsibility to secure justice, there are limits on the nature of 
the injustices and the type of interventions that corporations can 
be seen to be making. This case has made this point clear. Corpo-
rations can justifiably stand back to allow agents sanctioned by 
international law to act. 
 Mass starvation: The corporation would be closer to the 
front of the line, so to speak, to act in this case than with genocide 
but well behind several other responsibility-bearers. This might 
appear to some as an absurd conclusion, especially those who 
support a capacity-based view of responsibility. This conclusion 
seems to suggest that even though a corporation might possess 
vast financial resources that could contribute meaningfully to sav-
ing possibly millions of lives, it does not bear the responsibility 
to rush to the front of the line to do this. How could we justify 
such a position? The response calls upon our earlier discussion on 
the weaknesses of the capacity principle. We can only justifiably 
require an agent to act to remedy an injustice when it has not par-
ticipated in its creation, and when doing so will not create a new 
harm.36 The corporation has numerous claims on its resources in 
addition to its shareholders, namely employees, customers, sup-
pliers, and other financiers. Abandoning these responsibilities in 
favour of a crisis, as unpalatable as it might seem, could constitute 
a harm to these stakeholders. Of course, this does not preclude the 
corporation from making charitable contributions to the crisis. 
 Worker exploitation: The framework identifies the corpora-
tion as a leading responsibility-bearer when it comes to remedying 
101the injustice of worker exploitation. After the state, the corpora-
tion would be among the next in line to act given its strong par-
ticipation in the injustice. We would expect the corporation to not 
only contribute to remedy but also contribute to the promotion 
of institutions that would prevent this type of employment in the 
future, as well as changing its operational practices in the interim 
to avoid continued complicity in the unjust practice. 
 The thrust of the participation principle is felt most in the 
worker exploitation case because we can observe how the corpora-
tion is entangled in its creation and perpetuation. Even when cor-
porations do not perpetrate these injustices by virtue of participa-
tion in the social arrangements of trade, they benefit from it. The 
strength of the participation principle over capacity or effective-
ness is that it not only identifies the responsibility-bearer based 
on actual evidence of past and current participation, but also ap-
peals to a strong moral principle, that of avoiding doing harm. 
Conclusion
In theorizing the responsibility of agents to act to remedy injus-
tice, we face a tension between the effectiveness of the remedy and 
fairness to the agents. This is especially the case when an agent, 
such as a corporation, bears responsibilities to its stakeholders. 
By building the action-guidance framework on the participation 
principle, we avoid this tension since it eliminates the unfairness 
of the capacity principle without compromising effectiveness. The 
resulting framework shows that the corporation can justifiably 
refrain from action in unjust situations, where it bears no role-
responsibility, and where it has not participated in the injustice. 
However, it is required to be among the first responsibility-bearers 
to act when it can be judged to have participated.
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